In this paper, we will describe work in progress at the MITRE Corporation on embedding speechcnabled interfaces in Web browsers.
INTRODUCTION
For many yean, speech interaction has been seen as a critical aspect of multimodal human-computer interaction, along with more traditional graphical tools (for a summary of the range of such tools, see [4]). Advances in Intemet technologies have incnased considerably the range of "host" options for multimodal interfaces, moving from standalone applications to Web-based alternatives such as locallybased "helper" applications spawned by document type, HTMLbased interfaces to remote applications driven by CO1 scripts (for a particularly sophisticated example, see [q), Web-hosted applications in languages like Java or python enabled by mobile code technology, and more recently, locally-based applications set up as libraries to "plug in" to browsen like Netscape.
The HCI group at the MITRE Corporation has been involved for many years in the design and construction of advanced multimodal interfaces involving language understanding and generation, speech recognition and synthesis, interpxetation of deixis and direct manipulation, and graphic design and presentation. One of our current research goals is to duplicate, in Web-hosted interactions, the entire range of communication supported in our previous work. In this paper, we'll describe some of the components of this research program, concentrating on the role of speech.
COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS WORK
allows names of links to be selected by being spoken. Since then, "remote control" of Web browsers has made it possible to "drive" a browser without modifying it at all, by opening URLs, new windows, etc. through a limited extemal command language. However, thm is a fundamental difference between this sort of speechenabled browser behavior and being able to address Web-hosted applications themselves. The reason is that the Web browser need not even know that it's being spoken to, since the speech interaction itself is an application completely extemal to the browser. The speech "proxy" reads the page being displayed via the browser's "remote control" language;-parses it with its own HTML parser, creates its speech model. digests the user's speech, translates it back into the "remote control" language, and relays the command to the browser. For all the browser knows, the "remote control" command was typed in directly to the shell.
This situation contrasts fairly dramatically with the case of a multimodal application written in Java or Python which is downloaded in the course of Web navigation. If this application desires speech input, it (and not some extemal application) must somehow enable a connection between it, some speech recognition service, and a mimphone connected to the user's console; it (and not some external application) must ensure that the speech recognition service is aware of the application's language model; and it (and not some extemal application) must ensun that the appearance of the browser's viewer confonns to the requests the user makes. Furthermore, these requests are specific to the downloaded application, not general to the browser or the syntax of HTML. In other words, speech input to Web browsen can mnain external only as long as the addition of speech input does not depend at all on the hosted application itself. At that point, speech input must be enabled and driven from inside the browser, not from outside. So while it might be possible, for instance, to drive a forms interface via speech by using an extemal application to digest the contents of an ZfTML page which describes the forms interface and allow the user to navigate this interface with voice commands, and while it might even be possible to signal the availability of speech to the user within the Web browser by replacing the cumnt page (once digested) with a slightly ''edited" page which describes the available speech capabilities, that's as far as this technology goes. 
ENABLING SPEECH FROM WITHIN WEB BROWSERS
There is more than one way to extend the run-time behavior of Web browsers. The first is via mobile code. A mobile code language is nothing more than a programming language with an accompanying infrastructure for shipping and executing source-level or bytecode-level code on a variety of platforms in real time. Cmntly, the most common infrastructures for this code dishihtion are Web browsers. Examples are Java, supportcd by Netscape and Sun's HotJava browser, and python, supported by C " s Grail browser.
Special HTML tags are interpreted as instructions to downloadcode (called an uppkt) and run it, rather than display it as twrt or images.
Using such technology, it is possible to download applets which implement arbitrary window configurations within the browser's viewer, and associates arbitrary behavior with these interfaces. There are a number of ways to use these facilities to supply speech services to Web-hosted applications. The first issue to address is whether the speech services should be "inside" or "0utside"the Web browser. If the answer is "inside", these services should probably be provided via plug-ins, since they are intended to be reusable, the code which implements the service tends to be large, and at least portions of the service are not amenable to mobile code because they are platformdependent (for instance, those which deal with connecting to the local audio device, for which there are no standards as yet). While at least one recent Macintosh-based approach has opted for this strategy, we suspect that in the long run, many applications in addition to those hosted by the browser will desire speech services, and it seems more useful to implement them 'Outside'' the browser. At this point, we must address an additional issue: how the application within the browser accesses these services.
T h m is
We will discuss this issue in the next section.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF

DISTRIBUTED OBJECTIORIENTED SERVICES
Throughout this paper, we've talked about speech services, and we hope to give this notion substance in both the conceptual and implementational sense. For instance, MITRE'S Glacier speech recognition system can be configured as a garden-variety server, which accepts and manages multiple connections from multiple applications. Each application notifies the speech server of its language model, and the speech snuer.processes audio input according to these Various language models and selects a "winner" to receive the speech input according to some (potentially complex) algorithm.' The initial implementation of the Glacier speech server uses UMX message queues for communication between client and server, with the ensuing resmction that client and server must be on the same machine.
In practice, this sort of restriction is potentially inconvenient. In communicating with the speech server, we encounter all the problems which typify traditional client-server communication. Some communications layers, like message queues or pipes, quire client and server to be on the same machine; others, like sockets, do not, but require, in the most general case, that the implementer develop a low-level protocol which the client and server "speak" to each other. When a standard protocol such as RPC is introduced above the socket layer, it is typically not shared across platform types, and the client is still rrquired to know the location of the server. In general, what is desired is a service model which is transparent with respect to location, machine and OS type, and implementation language.
One answer to this set of problems is an architecture for distributed object services such as OMG's CORBA. In such an architecture, an object request broker (ORB) accepts client requests for services and provides services in the form of objectpmxies, location-, language-, and platform-independent pointers to the servers themselves. Clients use the types and object models of their own language (C++, Java, Common Lisp, Modula 3, Smalltalk, Python, 'Cumntly, Glacier's algorithm is a straightforward comparison of output scores from the speech recognition itself, but in other work with CMU's lanusrecognizersaver we arc experimentingwith algorithms guided at least panially by mouse and keyboard focus. etc.) to interact with the object proxies as if they were local objects. The object inelface -that is, the set of methods each CORBA object exports -serves as the abstract "bandwidth" through which communication with the object happens; the particular CORBA implementation provides data translation and communications protocols.
TYPE SpeechDevice
Our implementation consists of three pans. First, we have adopted w o n , an inte~reted object-oriented scripting language, as our primary implementation language. Second, we have adopted Grail, Figure 1 . This protocol covers subscribing and unsubscribing to speech services, altering the application's grammar, and requesting speech help.
This protocol must be paired with a method for n o t i m g the application about the status of speech input. In a hue distributed object model, the application itself is also an object service, and among the methods it supports is the notification protocol shown in Figure 2 . In such a model, the application obtains a proxy for the speech server and subscribes to speech, passing the server a proxy for the application itself. When the server detects the onset of speech, it notifies all applications, and when it detects the end of speech and determines a "winner", it notifies that application and notifies all other applications that they've lost We have implemented this communications model in our OLLI interface. Grail's Python interpreter operates in "restricted execution mode". which prohibits most interactions with the local operating system, such as opening and creating files, etc. In this way, the local machine is "protected". The Java security story is much more sophisticated; instead of arbitrarily restricted a particular set of operations, Java users can designate certain code as trusted, t h a b y relaxing the execution restrictions imposed on it (for details, sa [SD.
SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
As an example of the degree of subtlety required, consider an enormous (and intentional) security hole in Grail 0.2. We noted above that CORBA implementations rake we of the underlying communications protocols. EU's underlying protocol is RFC, which is in tum built on a socket layer. For an ItU-aware Web-hosted application to access local speech services, then, it must ultimately open a socket on a machine accessible to the console displaying the Web browser (perhaps on that console's machine itself) to communicate with the speech sewer via ILU. But this i n m a i o n is with the local operating system, which in principle ought to be disabled since a applet could exploit security holes in any socket server protocol on the local machine. Thus the argument for tsusted code: it's not the tools the applet uses, it's what it does with them that counts.
A number of considerations might conmbute to the "trustworthiness" of interactions with the local machine. We know that some interactions between Web-hosted applications and the local machine are permitted; the most obvious examples are keyboard and mouse input and visual output, all of which may be (in fact, must be) accessed by Grail and the applets it runs. These devices are deemed trustworthy (or, perhaps more correctly, must be deemed trustworthy in order to have any interaction at all). In the long sun, it might be possible to "license" other, higher-level devices as well, such as speech recognition.
Pan of this task is standardization of the services provided by these high-level devices, as we have sketched above. For instance, there are at least two standardization efforts underway for speech recognition, including the NoveU-led SRAPI consortium and Microsoft's SAP1 effort. In addition, it is part of the long-range CORBA strategy to codify and support services at a range of levels, from simple naming services to components of tools like word-processing programs; ceminly, at the level of sophistication intelligent multimodal interaction is attempting, only speech services are even close to being susceptible to this sort of codification. If access to such devices were deemed trustworthy and compiled into interface applications, much as keyboard and screen access is, the security threath posed by speech interaction in Web browsers would be reduced.
CONCLUSION
In our experiments, we have exploited other object services, including speech synthesis and language understanding. Indeed, interface services an merely one example of the potential impact of distributed object technology on Web applications. It is one of the most interesting, however, because in no other case is it necessary for the Web-hosted application to communicate w i t h the client console "outside" the Web browser. We believe that this requirement is due to the absence of standardization for input and output devices besides mouse, keyboard and visual display, and that our grasp and exploitation of such alternative devices (even audio) is still, comparatively, in its infancy.
